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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for a criminal
offense of possession of marijuana and possession of
marijuana without affixing the appropriate stamp, label and
other indicia of paid taxes required by Section 59-19-101.
Both offenses are third degree felonies. Proceedings were
held in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Boyd L. Park presiding.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
POINT I
Appellee argues the evidence seized pursuant to the
invalid warrant would nevertheless be admissible under the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule enunciated in
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

Appellant

responds to said argument as follows:
1.

Any reliance upon the "good faith exception" as

enunciated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) was
first made only on appeal. No argument or any factual
hearing addressing this issue was submitted to the District
Court.

The State now is precluded from raising the issue on

appeal.

State in the Interest of N.H.B., (Utah App. 1989)

777 P.2d 487; Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1048
(Utah App. 1990).
2.

Exclusion is a proper remedy wherein the issuing

magistrate abandons his judicial role. State v. Leon 468
U.S. at 927.
3.

The officers herein could not reasonably rely upon a

warrant based on the affidavit herein which is so lacking in
the indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in
its existence entirely unreasonable.
4.

In State v. Larocco, the Utah Court has held that

appropriate remedy for a violation of Article I, Section 14

iii

is exclusion.

State v. Larocco is appropriate precedent

under state constitutional analysis and mandates that
exclusion is an appropriate remedy.

iv

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
—000O000—

STATE OF UTAH,
REPLY BRIEF
Appellee/Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 900246-CA
BRYANT COLLARD,
Appellant/Defendant.)
—000O000—

REPLY BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for a criminal
offense of possession of marijuana and possession of
marijuana without affixing the appropriate stamp, label and
other indicia of paid taxes required by Section 59-19-101.
Both offenses are third degree felonies.

Proceedings were

held in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Boyd L. Park presiding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The prosecution on this appeal raises the issue of "good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule".

The basis of the

State's argument is that under the principle enunciated in
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) evidence, although

obtained through an invalid warrant, can nevertheless be
admissible under a good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule.

This new issue is now raised for the first time upon

appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
Issues raised for the first time on appeal are not
properly brought and will not be considered.

Wheeler ex rel.

Wheeler v. Mann. 763 P.2d 758 (Utah 1988); James v. Preston.
746 P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987); In the Interest of N.H.B., 777
P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1989).
The issue of the U.S. v. Leon exception was not raised
until the filing of appellee's brief.

It was not raised in

the lower court and thereby prejudices the defendant; it
denies the defendant the opportunity to present evidence or
argument relating to said issue.
Fairness precludes that the issue now be raised.
POINT II
In United States v. Leon, (1984)468 U.S. 897, 82 L.Ed.2d
677, 104 S.Ct. 3405, reh den 468 U.S. 1250, 82 L.Ed.2d 942,
105 S.Ct. 52, the Court held that suppression remains an
appropriate remedy where the issuing magistrate has wholly
abandoned his judicial role of neutrality and detachment.

2

In United States v. Guarino, (1984 DC RI) 610 F.Supp.
371 the District Court held that a warrant failed for the
lack of probable cause and the lack of particularity.

The

Court held that the required judicial role was never
exercised by the magistrate issuing the warrant and the
evidence seized thereunder was thus inadmissible.
In the present case, the magistrate failed to examine
the probable cause issue. Affiant officer herein obviously
camouflaged the information regarding the Collard residence
and the justification for that search within 53 paragraphs
dealing with Rex Taylor.

Only paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 deal

with the Collard residence in any form and is so lacking
regarding probable cause; it mandates a finding that the
magistrate abandoned his judicial role.
Upon any reasonable analysis of the information relating
to the Collard residence, any magistrate would find probable
case is lacking.

Whether fault should be assigned to the

affiant officer camouflaging said three paragraphs

or

whether the magistrate failed to properly examine the
probable cause assertions regarding the Collard residence, it
is obvious that the Court should have denied said petition.
POINT III
In United States v. Guarino, Supra., the government's
attempt to validate a search and seizure on the basis of the
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exception to the exclusionary rule established in the Leon
case failed for the reason that the executing officer must
have an objectively tested belief that the seizure was
reasonable.

The officer's conduct in Guarino could not be

viewed as objectively reasonable.
The Court concluded that a suppression of the materials
in that instant case was to deter unlawful police conduct and
the exclusion of evidence was justified thereby.
In United States v. Granger, (1984 W.D. Wis.) 596
F.Supp. 665, the Court there, knowing that the question of
good faith was solely whether the affidavit was so lacking in
the indicia of probable cause that it was unreasonable for
the FBI agent to rely upon it, concluded that no reasonably
well-trained law enforcement officer would have been
justified in relying upon the warrant, knowing, as the agent
did, of the paucity of information in the affidavit presented
to the magistrate.
See also United States v. Freitas, (1985, ND Cal.) 610
F.Supp. 1560 wherein the Court held that evidence obtained on
the basis of an invalid warrant should be suppressed.

The

Court noted that the deficiencies in the warrant and the
affidavit at issue did not turn on subtle inadequacies in the
probable cause showing or minor transgressions from proper
search warrant procedure.

On the contrary, the Court pointed
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out, citing Massachusetts v. Sheppard, (1984) 468 U.S. 981,
82 L.Ed.2d 737, 104 S.Ct. 3424 this was the appropriate
situation in which it was plainly evident that the magistrate
had no business issuing the warrant.

The Court found that

under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that
the affidavit contained no provision for notice of any kind
to the owner or occupants of the dwelling, and the reasons
offered to justify the search were patently inadequate in
view of extremely serious intrusion that the search entailed.
In the present case and setting, the affidavit is
fatally deficient in supporting any argument for probable
cause.
The affiant was also an officer executing the search
warrant upon the Collard residence.

Affiant Nielson alleged

that the probable cause allegations allegedly justifying a
search of the Collard residence within 53 paragraphs. With
the exception of paragraphs 16, 17 and 18, all paragraphs
deal with Rex Taylor.
The officer set forth in the warrant that he was
uncertain as to the location of marijuana, and he advised the
magistrate within the contents of the Affidavit, that the
unknown white male turned and walked into one of the houses.
Not only a statement of uncertainty as to the Collard
residence, but it is an obvious declaration by the officer
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that he does not know the whereabouts of the grocery bag
allegedly containing the marijuana.
In State v. Droneburq, 781 P.2d at 1305, the Utah court
found, and the State conceded, that the supporting affidavit
was so lacking in probable cause that it was unreasonable for
the officer who prepared the affidavit to rely upon warrant.
It is obvious in this case that the officer's
declarations within the affidavit advised the Court that he
does not know the whereabouts of the alleged marijuana.

It

would be completely unreasonable for the officer who prepared
the affidavit to rely upon the warrant.
The same officer acting as affiant and as a participant
in the execution of the warrant merely guessed as to the
location of the alleged marijuana.
In Droneburg the affidavit therein sought a no-knock
warrant to be executed at any time and requested
authorization for searching of controlled substances and/or
illegal narcotics at a Panguich residence and the vehicles
located at that address.

The affiant there requested the

warrant based upon information from a reliable informant.
Said informant informed the officer that a supply of illegal
substances were coming in.

The officer related that the

information was reliable because he had used this
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confidential informant before and had found him to be
reliable.
In the present setting, the three paragraphs relating to
the defendant herein, relate only that Taylor took a
circuitous route to arrive at 130 East 350 North, Orem, Utah;
that Collard resided there and had convictions for DUI and
theft (no drug related offenses); and that the officer saw
the grocery bag delivered to a white male in his twenties who
then turn and walk into one of the houses. No evidence is
given to suggest the description of Bryant Collard matched
this unknown white male in his twenties or otherwise.

The

officer also noted that the unknown white male did not
necessarily walk into the Collard residence but walk to some
unknown location.
POINT IV
Under state constitutional analysis, Utah courts have
not recognized the exceptions as granted under United States
v, Leon to the exclusionary rule.
In State v. Larocco, (Utah 1990) 135 Utah Adv. Rpts. 16,
the Utah Supreme Court held as follows:
We now expressly hold that exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence is a necessary
consequence of police violations of Article I,
Section 14. In reaching this conclusion, we have
found it useful to examine opinions from other
state courts. The rule that unlawfully acquired
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evidence is inadmissible in criminal trials did not
arise exclusively as a matter of federal
constitutional interpretation. On the contrary,
many states have held long before Mapp v. Ohio that
exclusion was required as a matter of state
constitutional law when police conduct violated
constitutional guarantees against unreasonable
search and seizure . . . Furthermore, by the time
Mapp v. Ohio made Weeks v. United States
exclusionary rule applicable to the states, more
than half of them were already voluntarily applying
it . . . At least eighteen states have adopted an
independent state constitutional exclusionary rule.
The critical question at this point in the
history of the federal exclusionary rule is not its
existence, but rather its nature and scope. The
United States Supreme Court's holding in Weeks case
in 1914 strongly suggested that the Court believed
that the admission of unconstitutionally obtained
evidence was itself unconstitutional and that the
exclusionary rule was therefore a constitutional
requirement. Forty-seven years later, Justice
Harlan, in his dissent in Mapp articulated the
views that the rule was not a constitutional
requirement, but rather a judicially created
remedy, a position taken by the majority of the
Court thirteen years later in United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). In Calandra Justice
Bennett argued in dissent that the rules primary
objective was not and never had been mere judicial
deterrence of police conduct. The rule was rather
a means of enforcement necessary to give content to
the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment and
deterrence was only a secondary benefit.
Since Calandra the United States Supreme Court
has, because of the prevailing view on that court
that the exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy and
not itself a constitutional requirement, created
several significant exceptions to it. See United
States v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Nicks v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). Thus, the
significant question which must be answered by the
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state courts considering independent state
exclusionary rules are "(1) whether the state
courts consider the exclusionary rule to be a
constitutional requirement; (2) whether the state
courts view deterrence as the only purpose behind
the rule; and (3) which governmental officials are
deemed to be the target of this deterrence." . . .
The case before us today does not raise any of
these questions, nor have they been briefed or
argued before this court. Wef therefore, say
nothing about the nature of the exclusionary rule
(constitutional requirement v. judicial remedy)
pursuant to Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution, we simply hold that it exists.
We are persuaded that the exclusion of the VIN
from evidence in this case might well have changed
the outcome, although the State had other evidence
of the theft, the jury might not have found it
convincing without the VIN. Therefore, we reverse
and remand this case for a new trial. That result
makes it unnecessary for us to treat additional
issues raised in this appeal.
The defendant argues that the exclusion of the illegally
obtained evidence as here, is a necessary consequence of
governmental violations of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
State Constitution.

Defendant submits that the exclusionary

rule is still an applicable and appropriate response to a
violation of Article If section 14. Violations of the
mandates of Article I, Section 14 state an appropriate
response of exclusion.
CONCLUSION
The State argues for the first time on appeal the issue
presented in United States v. Leon, Supra.
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Said issue has

never been treated by the trial court in any form.

No

presentation of facts or legal arguments have ever been
presented.

The State is precluded from raising said issue

for the first time on appeal.
If the Court was to treat the issue of whether exclusion
would be a proper remedy herein, the defendant submits that
even under the exceptions granted by State v. Leon, exclusion
is a proper remedy.

Defendant submits that the magistrate

failed in his role to examine the contents of the affidavit
and to make appropriate findings as to probable cause.

The

probable cause is so lacking in the present case that this
Court is bound to find that the magistrate abandoned from his
constitutionally mandated role.
Further the officer herein could not, in good faith,
rely upon the information supplied in the affidavit to
justify the search pursuant to the warrant.

The officer

camouflaged three paragraphs dealing with the Collard
residence in an affidavit of 53 paragraphs.

The officer

advises the Court in the affidavit that he is not familiar
with any facts which attributes the location of the alleged
marijuana to the Collard residence.

He advises the Court

particularly that he lacks information as to the location of
the marijuana.
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The Utah Courts have recognized that the exclusionary
rule is an appropriate remedy to the violation of Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution.

Utah Court in

State v. Larocco, supra, expressly held that the exclusion of
the illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of
police violations of Article I, Section 14. Even if the
State was to succeed upon the arguments of State v. Leon,
State v. Larocco mandates that the evidence be excluded under
state constitutional analysis.
DATED this

^

day of

4

JJc^^

SHELDENf R CARTER
Attorney for Defendant
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, 1991.
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